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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are utilized in a 
number of critical infrastructures, e.g. healthcare, disaster and 
relief. In sensitive environments, it is vital to maintain the 
operability of the network in an effort to support the decision-
making process that depends on the sensors’ observations. The 
network’s operability can be maintained if observations can 
reach the specified destination and also if the sensors have 
adequate energy resources. The operability is negatively affected 
by security attacks, such as the selective forward and the denial 
of service (DoS), that can be executed against the WSN. The 
attacks’ impact greatly depends on the attackers’ capabilities 
such as their knowledge and the number of malicious nodes they 
hold. Currently, the research community focuses on addressing 
casual attackers that don’t persist with their attack strategy. 
However, the proposed solutions cannot address persistent 
attackers that continue with their attack execution after the 
network has applied appropriate recovery countermeasures. 
Designing an adaptive recovery strategy is challenging as a 
number of issues need to be taken into consideration such as the 
network’s density, the number of malicious nodes and the 
persistent attack strategy. This research work formulates a 
persistent attack strategy and investigates the integration of 
different recovery countermeasures in WSNs. The evaluation 
results demonstrate that an adaptive recovery strategy can 
enhance the network’s recovery benefits, in terms of increased 
packet delivery and decreased energy consumption, and prolong 
its operability. Moreover, the observations made are envisioned 
to encourage new contributions in the area of adaptive intrusion 
recovery in WSNs.   
Keywords—WSN, resilience, recovery, persistent adversary, 
survivability, adaptability, intrusion recovery  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become an 
essential component of the cyberspace, supporting a variety of 
applications in the context of smart spaces [1]. Sensors are 
utilized in many smart environments (i.e. healthcare, 
surveillance, industrial, transportation) where security is 
considered a critical requirement. Cyberspace, and the 
emerging Internet of Things (IoTs), create many opportunities 
for delivering new services to a word-wide scale but also 
provide the resources (knowledge, tools) to adversaries to 
deliver more advanced attack strategies. Adversaries can 
become more persistent with their malicious objectives, thus 
compromisation can occur even if security measures are 
already implemented by a WSN. Security efforts should focus 
on enhancing the resilience of sensors’ operation during attack 
occurrences and thus promoting their operability.  
Some of the main assets that need to be protected in WSNs 
are the sensed data and the energy source. Critical applications 
rely on the sensed data [2] to support their services and the 
decision-making. To be able to relay data to the control center, 
sensors have to be available to communicate. Communication 
[2] is greatly dependent on the energy sources and on the 
sensors’ ability to access the wireless channel to 
transmit/receive data. There are a number of security attacks [3, 
4] in WSNs, e.g. blackhole, selective forward, DoS, that can 
disrupt sensors’ communication. Intrusion recovery measures 
should address compromisation and recovery of the network’s 
operation. So far, the research focus was mainly on designing 
intrusion recovery solutions i.e. [4-8] to combat non-persistent 
adversaries. Non-persistent adversaries execute an attack but 
do not continue with the attack execution when the network 
implements recovery countermeasures. These solutions are not 
effective in addressing adversaries that implement a persistent 
attack strategy which includes the continuation of an attack 
and/or the execution of different attacks. Thus, it is not 
adequate to only act proactively to protect the operation of a 
WSN, but it is equally important to be prepared for the 
existence of an intelligent attacker that will adjust his/her 
attacks to work around recovery countermeasures.   
The focus of this research work is to formulate a persistent 
attack strategy and then investigate the integration of different 
recovery measures in WSNs that can address such a strategy. 
The aim is to setup an adaptive recovery strategy that will 
promote the reliability and the survivability of the network 
during an adaptive attack execution. The idea is to enable the 
sensors to respond to the attacks that affect their 
communication capabilities and retain a level of operability 
that will allow the network to deliver information to the 
intended destination, i.e. a control center. However, designing 
an adaptive recovery strategy in WSNs is challenging as a 
number of issues [5] need to be considered such as the 
network’s density and the number of malicious nodes that 
trigger recovery countermeasures. This research work 
investigates how the aforementioned issues affect the recovery 
benefits in an effort to provide observations that could lead to 
the design of new recovery solutions that can maximize 
recovery benefits under the assumption of a persistent attacker. 
Section II presents the typical intrusion recovery solutions that 
are proposed in WSNs, section III presents the attacker profile 
and section IV discusses the rationale of the proposed 
investigations. Section V provides the evaluation analysis in 
terms of packet delivery and energy consumption. Section VI 
constitutes conclusions.   
II. RELATED WORK 
Intrusion recovery solutions in WSNs mainly address a 
single type of a security attack. Typical attacks [3,4] that are 
executed in WSNs, aiming to disrupt the communication, are 
blackhole/selective forwarding, eavesdropping and denial of 
service (DoS) attacks. A blackhole/selective forwarding attack 
can be implemented by malicious nodes that participate in the 
network communication and are chosen to forward packets to 
the destination/control center. When a malicious node receives 
packets, it can drop them or selectively decide which packets to 
discard. The main objective of this type of attack is to affect 
propagation of data to the control center.  Eavesdropping is an 
attack that aims to overhear communication in an effort to 
either identify sensors existence in the vicinity of the malicious 
node and/or steal packets. A DoS attack is implemented by 
continuously sending a number of packets through the wireless 
channel, affecting the communication and availability of the 
nodes. The blackhole/selective forward attack is addressed by 
blacklisting the malicious node and rerouting traffic [5,6,13] 
over a route path that does not contain the malicious node(s). 
Eavesdropping is difficult to address, especially if the 
malicious node is considered an internal part of the network 
and does not execute an active attack (e.g. DoS) that will 
indicate its presence. A DoS attack can be addressed by a low 
duty cycle [4] or a channel surfing strategy [7,8].  
III. ATTACKER PROFILE 
It is essential to identify and understand the characteristics 
[9] of potential attackers, in an effort to realize their objectives 
and capabilities and implement appropriate countermeasures to 
address the implemented attacks. There are two types of 
attackers: internal and external. Internal attackers are 
considered those that have either successfully inserted their 
own malicious nodes into the network or they have 
compromised legitimate nodes and turned them malicious. On 
the other hand, external attackers possess malicious nodes that 
are not considered part of the network. Internal attackers are 
more dangerous than external because they are perceived as 
trusted elements of the network and can participate in the 
routing paths. Due to this, designing recovery solutions to 
address internal attacker is more challenging than taking into 
consideration external attackers.   
Furthermore, an attacker can be characterized as casual or 
persistent based on the attack strategy that is applied. A casual 
attack strategy is considered to be deployed by an attacker with 
relevant knowledge to execute a single attack in an effort to 
disrupt the network’s communication. In this case the attacker 
has loose motivations to damage the network. However, a 
persistent attacker has strong motivations to affect the 
network’s communication, for example, in order to prohibit 
sensors to report a critical event (e.g. fire). Therefore, a 
persistent attacker is not discouraged by the recovery measures 
and continues his/her attack strategy, in order to continue 
affecting the network’s operation and maximizing the negative 
impact, posing a higher threat for the operability of the 
network. This type of attacker, has sufficient knowledge to 
execute a variety of attacks while the network applies recovery 
measures to address them.  
In this research work, an internal and persistent attacker is 
assumed. 
IV. RATIONALE OF ATTACK AND INTRUSION RECOVERY 
STRATEGY 
In this section, the rationale of the attack and the intrusion 
recovery integration investigations is presented. So far, 
research works focused on proposing countermeasures to 
address a specific security attack. A persistent attack strategy 
has not been actively investigated in omni-directional WSNs. 
Therefore, the integration (and potential benefits) of different 
intrusion recovery solutions has not been evaluated. 
The network’s operability is mainly depended on the 
sensors’ ability to communicate [2] with each other and 
propagate observations to a control center that will further 
process the data and take actions, if necessary. The sensors’ 
communication ability [2] is depended on the sensors’ 
available energy resources and on their ability to access the 
wireless channel to transmit/receive data. Typical security 
attacks that can affect the network’s communication ability are 
the selective forwarding and the DoS attacks. As already 
mentioned in section II, blacklisting and rerouting is usually 
deployed to recover from the selective forwarding attack. A 
low duty cycle and channel surfing are potential solutions that 
can address a DoS attack.  
In order to promote the objectives of this research work, an 
appropriate and realistic attack strategy is formulated, along 
with a relevant recovery strategy. The following objectives of a 
persistent adversary have been considered for the formation of 
the attack strategy: 
- Act unnoticed, for as long as possible 
- Save energy resources on malicious nodes 
- Priority to affect nodes that participate in routing paths 
- Progressively respond to a continuous self-healing 
network with a persistent/continuous attack, affecting 
as many nodes a possible; no consideration for saving 
energy resources on the malicious nodes 
The attacker is assumed to gradually enable the malicious 
nodes to execute the attacks so he/she can delay suspicion. To 
be able to act undercover and prolong the possibility for 
detection, malicious nodes are first assumed to implement a 
selective forward attack. When a malicious node is 
participating on an active route path, it can drop data packets 
and prohibit their propagation. With this attack, malicious 
nodes could be considered by the rest of the network as 
malfunctioning and not perceived as malicious. If detection 
measures are implemented, the sensor network can converge to 
new routing paths to avoid the “malfunctioning” nodes. Since 
recovery measures will be implemented, the selective 
forwarding attack will turn ineffective. The attacker is not 
discouraged by the recovery measures and further actions are 
taken by the malicious nodes to continue affecting the 
network’s communication. Since batteries [2] are the typical 
energy source in WSNs, the attacker would like to safeguard 
the malicious nodes’ energy so he/she could have more 
opportunities to attack the sensors. Therefore, his/her attack 
strategy could be configured appropriately to consume only the 
minimum necessary energy. An attack that can actively disrupt 
the network’s communication is a DoS. Malicious nodes can 
transmit a large number of packets to cause packet collisions, 
retransmissions, energy consumption, etc. All these can greatly 
affect the network’s reliability, availability and survivability. 
Since a DoS is a resource demanding attack, the attacker could 
use it only when there are nodes near the compromised nodes. 
So, the malicious nodes enter a promiscuous mode in an 
attempt to overhear communication, a fact that will indicate 
that there are sensor nodes in their vicinity. When they 
overhear communication, they initiate a DoS attack. If the 
attacker decides to maximize the attack’s impact, he/she can 
configure the malicious nodes to enforce a more persistent 
behavior, that is for all the malicious nodes to execute a DoS 
attack. The sensor network continues with the recovery 
measures and implements a low duty cycle in an attempt to 
withstand the DoS attack and recover a level of operability that 
will allow sensors to propagate observations to the appropriate 
authorities and support decision-making. If the malicious nodes 
still continue to affect communication when the sensor nodes 
operate in the low duty cycle, the network applies a channel 
surfing countermeasure to update to a new channel frequency 
and hence exclude the malicious nodes from the 
communication. Since an intelligent attacker is assumed, in this 
case the malicious nodes enter a scanning phase to identify the 
new frequency channel. As far as we know, the aforementioned 
example adaptable intrusion and recovery strategies are the 
first to be proposed in the context of WSNs.  Our objective is 
to raise awareness of this type of intelligent persistent attacks 
and hence formulate adaptive intrusion recovery strategies. The 
proposed intrusion recovery strategies should take into 
consideration the adversary’s persistency, and aid the WSN to 
selfheal and continue applying recovery measures in an effort 
to withstand the attacks and eliminate or minimize the impact. 
Overall, the aim would be to maintain a level of operability that 
would allow the sensors to propagate their observations and 
support decision-making.    
V. NETWORK’S OPERABILITY WITH INTRUSION RECOVERY 
ADAPTABILITY 
The ns2 simulator has been utilized to facilitate 
investigations. An IEEE 802.15.4 network has been simulated 
consisting of sensor nodes that are equipped with an omni-
directional antenna. Sender nodes generate constant bit rate 
(CBR) traffic with a rate of 2 packets per second and a packet 
size of 70 bytes, following reactive routing, under the 
assumption of a detected event. A dense (550x550m) and a 
sparse (750x750m) network topology have been specified, 
consisting of 100 nodes each. Moreover, 5% and 10% 
randomly selected malicious nodes are considered. Initial 
energy is 100 Joules. Power consumption is based on a 
CC2400 WSN transceiver and LOS radio conditions are 
considered. Each experiment is repeated 30 times and the 
presented results have been averaged over the set of the 30 
simulation runs. More details can be found in [11]. 
This research work focuses on investigating the network’s 
performance in terms of packet delivery and energy 
consumption [12]. The operability of the WSN under a 
persistent adversary can be achieved if the packer delivery can 
be recovered and the energy consumption due to the attacks 
can be kept low. Recovering the packet delivery can support 
taking decisions reliably. Decreasing the energy consumption 
due to the attacks means that the network’s survivability can be 
enhanced. 
Initially a normal network operation is simulated and serves 
as the initial reference point for the rest of the attack and 
recovery scenarios. The sparse topology demonstrates an 
85.7% versus a 74.3% packet delivery that is presented by the 
dense topology. The lower packet delivery observed in the 
dense topology is due to a higher number of collisions and 
packet drops that occur due to the higher node density. Based 
on the persistent attack strategy that is considered in this 
research work, malicious nodes that have become part of a 
route path implement a selective forward attack. The selective 
forward attack affects the network’s performance in all 
scenarios. The success of this attack depends upon many 
factors such as the location of the malicious nodes towards the 
active packet flow, the number of malicious nodes and the 
density of the network. As figure 1 demonstrates, as malicious 
nodes in the network increase, the packet delivery decreases. A 
higher number of malicious nodes means that they have more 
chances to be selected to participate in routing and therefore 
affect more active route paths. The packet delivery is decreased 
by 26% and by 33.6% when considering 5% and 10% 
malicious nodes respectively in the sparse topology. In the 
dense case, the packet delivery is decreased by 11.3% and 
19.6% respectively. Furthermore, the selective forward attack 
is more effective in the case of sparse topologies compared to 
the dense topologies. In a higher density network, a malicious 
node has fewer chances to be selected to route paths and 
therefore can affect less the network’s ability to propagate 
observations to the destination. As it can be observed, the 
packet delivery is about 14% less in the sparse topology 
compared to the dense one, when considering 10% malicious 
nodes. Also the energy consumption (fig. 2) is decreased since 
there are less packets propagated in the network. The sparse 
topology demonstrates up to 12% less energy consumption 
than the dense topology.  
As soon as the network detects the selective forward attack, 
sensor nodes blacklist the malicious nodes and update the 
routing paths to exclude them from the communication. As the 
networks address more active malicious nodes, they show a 
higher ability to increase their packet delivery (fig. 1). The 
sparse topology presents a higher increase percentage (fig. 3 
and 4), up to 31.8%, compared to the dense topology that goes 
up to 10.3%. As previously mentioned, in the dense topology 
malicious nodes have fewer chances to route packets compared 
to the sparse topology. However, as the network applies 
recovery measures and updates routing paths, undetected 
malicious nodes in the dense topology increase their chance to 
route packets. Therefore, while the dense network excludes 
previously detected malicious nodes from the communication 
and tries to recover, the updated routing paths continue to be 
affected by the undetected malicious nodes that are now 
selected to forward observations to the destination.  
When the network is able to recover from the selective 
forward attack, the malicious nodes are excluded from the 
routing paths. This situation does not discourage the attacker 
since he/she can execute another attack in an effort to continue 
affecting the operability of the network. Since one of the 
attacker’s objectives is to save energy resources, the malicious 
nodes eavesdrop first on the network’s communication to 
identify if there are active nodes in their vicinity. If they detect 
communication, they execute a DoS attack by continuously 
sending route control packets. The packet delivery is affected 
more in the dense network where it is decreased by 33% 
compared to a 26% decrease that occurs in the sparse network 
when 10% malicious nodes are considered. This is due to the 
high node density that appears in the dense network, thus 
malicious nodes can overhear communication from more 
neighbor nodes and therefore affect more nodes by initiating 
the DoS attack. The attack is causing packet drops, 
retransmissions, triggers the route path maintenance procedure 
a number of times and therefore the energy consumption is 
increased in all cases. In an effort to maximize the attack’s 
impact, the attacker is assumed to instruct all malicious nodes 
to execute the DoS attack. The sparse topology is affected 
more than the dense topology in terms of communication. The 
sparse topology decreases by 5% its packet delivery, compared 
to 1% that is observed in the dense topology. This occurs 
because more malicious nodes are executing the DoS in the 
sparse topology as previously they have been inactive since 
they weren’t overhearing anything. Therefore, they didn’t 
attack based on an overhearing case as in the case that occurred 
in the dense topology where more malicious nodes were 
eavesdropping traffic. The network implements a low duty 
cycle to address the DoS attack. The packet delivery capability 
of the network is affected as the malicious nodes increase and 
also based on their location (if they are located near active 
route paths). While the DoS attack is implemented by fewer 
malicious nodes, the packet delivery (fig. 3) decreases by 22% 
and by 16% in the case of dense and sparse topologies 
respectively, when considering 5% malicious nodes. The 
impact of the DoS attack is higher in the dense network as 
more nodes implement the low duty cycle as the neighborhood 
density is higher in the vicinity of the malicious nodes. Also, a 
number of the nodes that have applied the recovery measure in 
the dense network are located in the active route paths, 
therefore the route maintenance procedure is triggered to 
update the paths. This is difficult to achieve as a number of 
nodes are unavailable to participate in the update of the active 
paths, causing a higher number of packet loss and 
retransmissions. However, as the number of malicious nodes 
increases from 5% to 10%, the communication capability is 
greater affected in the sparse topology. The lower density 
neighborhood does not favor the low duty cycle recovery 
measure as it gets harder for the nodes to update the active 
paths compared to the dense network. The packet delivery (fig. 
4) is decreased by 30% and by 27% in the sparse and dense 
topology respectively, when considering 10% malicious nodes. 
Although the low duty cycle measure affects the packet 
delivery, it safeguards the energy resources of sensor nodes and 
therefore it still enhances the operability of the network by 
promoting its survivability. The energy consumption is 
decreased by 56% and by 57% in the dense and sparse 
topology, when considering 10% malicious nodes.  
 
                                              
f                     Fig. 1: Packet delivery versus attack evolution 
 
Fig. 2: Energy consumption versus attack evolution 
 
Fig. 3: Packet delivery % recovery gain with 5% malicious nodes 
 
         Fig. 4: Packet delivery % recovery gain with 10% malicious nodes 
 If the malicious nodes persist with the DoS attack, the 
network can implement another recovery measure, the channel 
surfing, in an effort to recover the network’s reliability. The 
sensors switch to a different frequency and exclude the 
malicious nodes from the communication. The sparse network 
favors the adoption of the channel surfing as it can update the 
frequency and converge to new routing paths easier than the 
dense topology in terms of less packet collisions, packet 
retransmissions and packet loss. This justifies the higher 
decrease of energy consumption, up to 15% less in the sparse 
topology compared to the dense case, when considering 10% 
malicious nodes. Furthermore, an increase of up to 31% packet 
delivery is observed in the sparse topology compared to an 
increase of 20.2% that occurs in the dense topology. The 
network may have been able to recover, but the malicious 
nodes are still in the network. As the malicious nodes cannot 
overhear anything, they adapt their strategy and they scan 
available frequency channels for network communication. If 
they can overhear nodes’ communication, they stop scanning 
and use the discovered frequency channel to continue the DoS 
attack. The attack increases the network’s energy consumption 
and affects the packet delivery once more. The sparse topology 
achieves an overall 48% packet delivery, when considering 
10% malicious node. The dense topology presents an overall 
36.5% packet delivery. The network can continue applying the 
low duty cycle and/or the channel surfing measure in order to 
establish communication over a different frequency channel 
and promote the network’s operability. 
VI. SUGGESTIVE STRATEGIES WITH INTRUSION RECOVERY 
ADAPTABILITY 
  A shown in section V, in order to address a persistent 
attack strategy, an adaptable intrusion recovery strategy is 
required. The evaluation results show that a blacklisting and 
rerouting measure, in order to address a selective forwarding 
attack, favors a sparse network in terms of increasing the 
packet delivery capability of the nodes and maintaining a 
higher overall delivery percentage compared to the dense 
network case. In the case of recovering from the DoS attack, a 
sparse topology can take benefit of a low duty cycle when there 
are fewer malicious nodes executing the attack. Otherwise, as 
malicious nodes increase and more nodes in the network are 
affected and apply a low duty cycle, the packet delivery in a 
sparse topology is affected more compared to the dense case. 
The channel surfing measure also favors a sparse network to 
recover its packet delivery capability, as the malicious nodes 
increase, and the low node density aids the network to update 
to the new frequency and converge easily to new routing paths. 
In terms of safeguarding the energy consumption, the low duty 
cycle presents the best defense against an active attack such as 
the DoS. However, this is at the expense of the packet delivery 
capability of the network. Blacklisting, rerouting and the 
channel surfing recovery measures increase the energy 
consumption but at the same time they promote the operability 
of the network in terms of delivering packets to the destination 
and supporting the decision-making process. Depending on the 
objectives and requirements set by the WSN application [1], 
the appropriate security recovery measures can be selected to 
address a persistent attack strategy.        
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The utilization of an adaptive intrusion recovery strategy 
can aid the network to recover and prolong its operability 
against a persistent attacker. An adaptive recovery strategy 
promotes the network’s self-heal capability under a variety of 
attack scenarios. In terms of operability, recovery efforts 
should concentrate in improving the packet delivery capability 
of the network and in decreasing the energy consumption that 
occurs due to an attack. Thus, a reliable decision-making and 
the network’s survivability can be promoted. Designing an 
adaptive intrusion recovery strategy in WSNs is challenging as 
a number of issues need to be considered such as the network’s 
density and the adversary’s capabilities in terms of potential 
attacks foreseen to be executed and the number of malicious 
nodes that are under the control of the attacker. Moreover, the 
location of the malicious nodes need to be considered, for 
example, if they are located on an active route path or if they 
are neighbors to nodes participating in routing. As future work, 
the aforementioned aspects will be further investigated in an 
effort to maximize the recovery benefits that are demonstrated 
in this research work.  
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